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Abstract
Boston University School of Law and the Boston University Law Review are proud to publish this
Symposium on Dworkin’s final book, Religion Without God (Harvard University Press, 2013), as a sequel
to our 2009 Symposium on his Justice for Hedgehogs. The Symposium includes an introduction and
eulogy by James E. Fleming and contributions by a number of the most distinguished scholars of law and
religion in the United States and the United Kingdom: Jeremy Waldron, Stephen L. Carter, Paul Horwitz,
Andrew Koppelman, Cécile Laborde, Linda C. McClain, Micah Schwartzman, and Steven D. Smith.
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I.

RONALD DwoRKIN: A EULOGY

Ronald Dworkin is widely and rightly viewed as the most important legal
philosopher and constitutional theorist of our time, and as one of the leading
figures in moral and political philosophy. In the words of Marshall Cohen,
Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously "is the most important work in
jurisprudence since H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law and, from a
philosophical point of view at least, the most sophisticated contribution to that
subject yet made by an American writer."' And Cohen wrote those words
about Dworkin's first book in 1977! Dworkin's many outstanding subsequent
books and articles made good on that early, prescient assessment. Dworkin is
unmatched and unrivaled in legal philosophy and constitutional theory.
Over the years, I have organized a number of conferences in constitutional
theory, and Dworkin was often the most appropriate keynote speaker. In
conferences at Fordham University School of Law on "Fidelity in
Constitutional Interpretation" and "Rawls and the Law," 2 and at Boston
* Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law
at Boston University School of Law. This Introduction draws from a fuller eulogy. See Jim
Fleming, Ronald Dworkin: A Eulogy, BALKINIzATIoN (Feb. 17, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot
.coI2013/02/ronald-dworkin-eulogy.html, archivedat http://perma.cc/C4JS-FJ4A.
I Marshall Cohen, He'd Rather Have Rights, N.Y. REv. BOOKS (May 26, 1977),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1977/may/26/hed-rather-have-rights, archived at
http://perma.cc/6XBF-VPRF (reviewing RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977)).
2 Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and
Nerve, 65 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1249 (1997); Ronald Dworkin, Rawls and the Law, 72
1201
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University School of Law on his book, Justice for Hedgehogs,3 Dworkin
delivered powerful and eloquent keynote lectures. The readers of this
Symposium are likely familiar with the countless accounts of Dworkin's
brilliance as a lecturer, of how he spoke without notes and with great flair,
making it all seem so graceful and effortless. Even more impressive, in my
experience, was how seriously he took his lectures and how energetically he
responded to his interlocutors. In the conference at Boston University on the
penultimate draft of Justicefor Hedgehogs, held in 2009 when Dworkin was
seventy-eight years old, he demonstrated his characteristic energy by
responding extemporaneously to all thirty-one commentators, one panel at a
time, and elaborating those initial thoughts in a published response. 4 I had the
privilege of writing the biographical entry on Dworkin in the Yale
BiographicalDictionary of American Law, and closed that entry by stating:
"His work abounds with indefatigable energy, giving the impression that he
would not stop making arguments until he put the clamps of reason upon every
rational being. ''5 Dworkin substantially revised the draft of Justice for
Hedgehogs in light of the Boston University Symposium and incorporated
many of his responses.
Dworkin's work in legal philosophy and constitutional theory was so
powerful and fecund that it could inspire many careers wholly dedicated to
building upon it and working out its implications. Dworkin (along with John
Rawls) has been a powerful inspiration for my own work in constitutional
theory. My Securing ConstitutionalDemocracy: The Case of Autonomy puts

forward a "'Constitution-perfecting' theory" that aims, in the spirit of6
Dworkin, to interpret the U.S. Constitution so as to make it the best it can be.
Sotirios Barber's and my book, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic
Questions, is a response to Dworkin's call, in Taking Rights Seriously, for a
"fusion of constitutional law and moral theory."' 7 And Linda McClain's and my
book, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues, responds to
charges that liberals like Dworkin take rights too seriously, developing a civic
liberalism that takes responsibilities and civic virtues - as well as rights seriously. 8

FORDHAM L. REV. 1387 (2004).

3 Ronald Dworkin, Justicefor Hedgehogs, 90 B.U. L. REV. 469 (2010).
4 Ronald Dworkin, Response, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1059 (2010).
1 James E. Fleming, Ronald Dworkin, in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LAW 178, 179 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
6 JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONsTrruTIoNAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY
4-6, 73-74, 210-11 (2006).
7 SoTRIuos A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE
BASIC QUESTIONS, at xiii (2007) (quoting DwORKIN, supra note 1, at 149).
8 JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILmES, AND VIRTUES 3 (2013).
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Dworkin's successor as Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University,
John Gardner, put it well when he said: "The loss of Ronnie takes a bit of the
sparkle out of life as a philosopher of law."9 But those who knew Dworkin and
learned from his teaching and writing will never forget the thrill of engaging
with him and building upon his work. His sparkling prose, the staggering
ambition and monumental achievements of his works, and the flair and gusto
of his arguments and insights will never cease to illuminate and inspire. We
shall not look upon his like again. Ronald Dworkin made legal philosophy and
constitutional theory the best they can be.
II.

DWORKIN's RELIGION WiTHOUT GOD: AN INTRODUCTION

We at Boston University and the Boston University Law Review are proud to
publish this Symposium on Dworkin's Religion Without God as a sequel to our
2009 Symposium on his Justicefor Hedgehogs. As Linda McClain puts it in
her contribution:
It has been a palpable if bittersweet pleasure to read Dworkin's final
book, Religion Without God, mindful that he had "planned to greatly
extend his treatment of the subject over the next few years," but was
prevented from doing so by illness. The book is based on lectures, which
are so vividly and characteristically in Dworkin's voice that it is really
like being in a room hearing him speak again.10
The book displays many of Dworkin's characteristic argumentative
strategies as well as characteristic substantive arguments. I I In Religion Without
God, as in his prior books, Life's Dominion12 and Is Democracy Possible

Here?,'3 Dworkin tackles a polarizing issue where parties are at "war" and
proposes that, by dispelling "intellectual confusion" and offering a fresh
understanding of what is really at issue, they may be able to have a cease fire
or, at least, a substantial reduction of hostility and conflict. 14 In Religion
Without God, Dworkin takes on the seemingly "wholly unbrideagable gap" 15
16
between "believers and nonbelievers" in "the new religious wars" in politics.
He argues that "[i]f we can separate God from religion," this new
9 Ronald Dworkin, 1931-2013, UNIV. OF OXFORD (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.law.ox.ac.
uk/newsitem=537, archivedat http://perma.cc/F9NS-R3TW.
10Linda C. McClain, Can Religion Without God Lead to Religious Liberty Without
Conflict?, 94 B.U. L. REv. 1273, 1319 (2014) (footnote omitted) (quoting RONALD
DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD, at ix (2013)).
11See id. at 1288-98 (fully exploring Dworkin's characteristic argumentative strategies
and substantive arguments as carried forward in Religion Without God). I draw from
McClain's account here.
12RONALD DWORKIN, LIrE's DOMINION (1993).
13RONALD DWORKIN, Is DEMOCRACY POssiBLE HERE? 1, 2 (2006).
14DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 4, 10-11.
15 Id. at 147.
16Id. at 9, 137.

1204

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1201

understanding of "what the religious point of view really is" has the potential
to "shrink both the size and importance"
of such wars, or at least to "lower...
17
the temperature of these battles.'
Further, by framing religious freedom around protecting "a [general] right to
ethical independence" rather than a "troublesome special right" for theistic
religious people - a characteristic substantive argument in Life's Dominion, Is
Democracy Possible Here?, and Justicefor Hedgehogs - Dworkin calls for a
"radical reinterpretation of all the constitutions, [human rights] conventions,
and human rights covenants. '18 In all four works, the new understanding
Dworkin urges rests on principles about dignity, responsibility, and the
intrinsic value of human life, with implications for limitations upon
governmental authority. He gave these principles their fullest formulation in
Justice for Hedgehogs, and many in this Symposium no doubt observe the
continuity in substantive arguments between that work and Religion Without
God.
Above all else, Dworkin's Religion Without God, like all his works,
manifests an unwavering confidence in the power of reasoning.
Some critics will point out that Dworkin is not likely to persuade all
religionists, and certainly not all conservative religionists, to adopt liberal
positions on issues such as the right of a woman to decide whether to terminate
a pregnancy or the right of same-sex couples to marry. Or to persuade them to
adopt his view that there can be such a thing as "religion without God" or,
heaven forbid, a "religious atheist"!
But, with all due respect, that surely should not be the criterion for judging
whether the book is a success or whether it might help moderate the culture
wars surrounding these issues. I would suggest that the book might be a
success, even if it fails to persuade a single religionist to change his or her
substantive position on religious liberty, abortion, or gay and lesbian rights, if:
1. the book powerfully recasts and articulates the arguments of religious
atheists;
2. this articulation persuades some religionists to accord greater respect to
the arguments and positions of religious atheists;
3. this articulation persuades some atheists to recast their arguments in
religious atheist terms so as to moderate the disagreement and to promote
dialogue with religionists on terms of greater respect and civility; and
4. this articulation firms up liberal arguments for the rights to reproductive
freedom and same-sex marriage, thereby solidifying the positions of some
liberals who have doubts about the basis for those rights (based perhaps
on the relentless criticism of Roe v. Wade' 9 all these years).

17Id. at 9.
18Id at 133.
19 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

2014]

INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM

1205

Judged by such criteria, I daresay, Dworkin's Religion Without God is a
splendid success!
We are honored to include in the Symposium contributions by a number of
the most distinguished scholars of law and religion in the United States and the
United Kingdom. We are especially honored to include a piece by Jeremy
Waldron, colleague of and partner with Dworkin and Thomas Nagel in the
famous New York University Colloquium in Legal, Political, and Social
Philosophy. We believe that this Symposium is worthy of Dworkin. We are
confident that he would have relished the criticism and would have enjoyed the
forceful engagement with his arguments!

